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Abstract:	The	Internet	of	Things	(IoT)	is	already	transforming	industries,	cities,	and	homes.	The	economic	value	of	this	transformation	across	all	industries	is	estimated	to	be	trillions	of	dollars	and	the	societal	impact	on	energy	efficiency,	health,	and	productivity	are	enormous.	Alongside	potential	benefits	of	interconnected	smart	devices	comes	increased	risk	and	potential	for	abuse	when	embedding	sensing	and	intelligence	into	every	device.	One	of	the	core	problems	with	the	increasing	number	of	IoT	devices	is	the	increased	complexity	that	is	required	to	operate	them	safely	and	securely.	This	increased	complexity	creates	new	safety,	security,	privacy,	and	usability	challenges	far	beyond	the	difficult	challenges	individuals	face	just	securing	a	single	device.	We	highlight	some	of	the	negative	trends	that	smart	devices	and	collections	of	devices	cause	and	we	argue	that	issues	related	to	security,	physical	safety,	privacy,	and	usability	are	tightly	interconnected	and	solutions	that	address	all	four	simultaneously	are	needed.	Tight	safety	and	security	standards	for	individual	devices	based	on	existing	technology	are	needed.	Likewise	research	that	determines	the	best	way	for	individuals	to	confidently	manage	collections	of	devices	must	guide	the	future	deployments	of	such	systems.	
Introduction	Increasingly	we	live	in	a	world	of	connected	smart	devices.	This	“Internet	of	Things”	(IoT)	combines	devices	with	sensor	capabilities	and	connectivity	to	the	cloud	and	allows	them	to	leverage	artificial	intelligence,	machine	learning,	and	big	data	analytics,	sometimes	dramatically	increasing	their	capabilities.	Everyday	users	have	progressed	from	having	a	single	home	computer	to	a	variety	of	devices	that	are	each	individually	managed,	which	can	be	difficult.	For	example,	due	to	consumers	failing	to	change	the	default	password,	many	baby	monitors	allow	arbitrary	strangers	on	the	web	to	view	unsuspecting	people’s	homes.		But	the	proliferation,	capabilities,	and	interconnectedness	of	smart	devices	present	dramatic	new	opportunities	and	challenges	that	require	new	research	and	industry	approaches	to	make	such	systems	safe,	secure,	effective,	and	usable.	The	problem	is	so	acute	that	the	FBI	recently	issued	a	public	service	announcement	suggesting	consumers	should	“Isolate	IoT	devices	on	their	own	protected	networks”	and	“...be	aware	of	the	capabilities	of	the	devices…”	which	are	expectations	highly	unlikely	to	be	followed	in	practice.	In	this	paper,	we	argue	that	collections	of	smart	devices	present	new	challenges	that	require	a	greater	understanding	of	how	people	can	effectively	use	such	systems	and	a	deeper	investment	in	policies	and	tools	that	give	users	confidence	in	them.	In	particular,	issues	related	to	security,	physical	safety,	privacy,	and	usability	are	tightly	interconnected	and	solutions	that	address	all	four	simultaneously	are	needed.		There	have	been	numerous	estimates	of	the	impact	of	the	Internet	of	Things	on	the	economy,	with	estimates	that	the	number	of	deployed	devices	will	be	50	billion	by	the	year	2020	and	that	the	total	economic	impact	may	be	up	to	10	trillion	dollars	by	2025.	We	already	live	in	a	world	of	interconnected	devices,	with	numerous	companies	offering	smart	devices	such	as	smart	thermostats,	smart	doorbells,	etc.	In	the	so-called	Industrial	Internet	of	Things	and	Smart	Cities	initiatives,	factories	and	cities	will	become	infiltrated	with	interconnected	smart	devices,	with	large	
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projected	improvements	in	efficiency	and	reliability.	For	example,	hospitals	have	benefitted	from	a	proliferation	of	interconnected	sensor	devices,	resulting	in	improved	health	outcomes	and	lower	costs.		Unfortunately,	as	the	number	and	connectivity	of	such	devices	increases,	the	challenge	of	managing	these	collections	of	devices	becomes	exponentially	more	difficult.	If	managing	a	single	home	computer	is	difficult	for	a	non-technical	person,	imagine	what	is	needed	to	understand	and	correctly	manage	a	network	of	many	interacting	devices?	For	example,	consider	a	hypothetical	scenario	where	an	Apple	iPhone,	a	Ring	doorbell,	an	Amazon	Echo	and	an	Xbox	work	together.	The	iPhone	is	used	the	configure	them	and	the	Echo	is	used	to	to	implement	voice	commands	so	that,	for	example,	a	user	could	tell	Echo	to	show	the	video	feed	from	the	Ring	on	the	TV	using	the	Xbox.	Another	example	could	focus	on	energy	usage	and	home	monitoring.	Smart	water	and	electricity	meters	could	coordinate	to	monitor	and	adjust	water	and	power	while	determining	what	patterns	of	home	activity	correlate	to	high	usage.		Making	a	single	device	secure	and	safe	is	already	a	difficult	problem.	Safety	issues,	in	particular,	are	increasingly	important	for	IoT	systems	as	they	are	used	to	physically	control	electrical	devices	like	light	bulbs	and	heating	systems	in	both	homes	and	in	businesses.	The	safety	problems	discovered	with	the	Samsung	Galaxy	Note	smartphones	catching	fire	illustrate	the	challenges	making	devices	safe	even	without	an	attacker	trying	to	cause	harm.	Making	them	safe	in	the	presence	of	an	attacker	is	even	more	difficult	and	requires	rethinking	how	such	devices	are	designed	and	tested	for	safety.	The	consequences	of	having	many	insecure	individual	devices	attached	to	the	internet	was	highlighted	recently	when	the	Marai	malware	was	used	to	create	a	380,000	IoT-based	botnet	used	in	a	massive	distributed	denial	of	service	(DDOS)	attack.	Only	a	month	later,	a	major	cyberattack	harnessed	tens	of	millions	of	machines,	including	a	large	number	of	IoT	devices,	aimed	at	the	Internet’s	domain	name	server	(DNS)	infrastructure,	disrupting	a	number	of	major	service	providers	including	Twitter,	Netflix,	Spotify,	Airbnb,	Reddit,	Etsy,	SoundCloud	and	The	New	York	Times.	As	more	insecure	nodes	are	attached,	the	leverage	an	attacker	gets	in	using	them	increases.		Beyond	the	existing	challenges	of	securing	individual	devices,	we	need	to	simplify	how	people		interact	with	a	collection	of	devices	so	that	they	don’t	have	to	think	about	each	device	and	how	they	might	interact.	For	example,	with	an	iPhone,	Echo,	Ring,	and	Xbox,	what	information	is	being	shared	between	the	devices	and	what	are	the	privacy	policies	in	place	regarding	what	information	from	a	private	home	can	be	sent	to	the	different	companies	and	how	can	this	information	be	used?	Beyond	privacy,	what	security	vulnerabilities	does	this	particular	collection	of	devices	create	and	what	entity	is	responsible	for	informing	owners	that	such	vulnerabilities	exist?	In	much	the	same	way	that	operating	systems	have	evolved	to	allow	individual	users	to	configure	and	manage	them,	new	technology	is	needed	for	users	to	more	easily	understand,	configure,	and	manage	their	collections	of	devices.		In	this	paper,	we	consider	two	scenarios	where	collections	of	devices	create	opportunities	and	challenges:	interconnected	devices	in	a	smart	home	and	device	collections	in	hospitals.	By	looking	at	both	a	consumer-oriented	scenario	and	safety-critical	commercial	applications,	we	can	observe	similarities	and	differences	in	the	requirements	for	such	systems.		
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The	Internet	cartoon	Joy	of	Tech's	interpretation	of	the	future	of	IoT	
	
		
Smart	Devices	in	Homes	Despite	the	availability	of	many	connected	solutions	for	the	home,	the	rapid	growth	of	this	space	has	outpaced	security	and	privacy	research,	regulatory	guidelines,	discussions	on	longevity	and	safety,	and	a	general	understanding	of	how	such	systems	reflect	human	understanding	and	mental	models.	However,	the	emergence	of	scalable	smart	home	systems	has	the	potential	to	directly	impact	our	daily	lives.	Thus,	we	present	a	set	of	opportunities	and	challenges	for	computing	research	for	smart	home	technology.		With	more	and	more	connected	appliances	appearing	on	the	market—such	as	Jarden’s	Mr.	Coffee™	and	Crock-Pot™—new	physical	safety	hazards	emerge	due	to	the	ability	for	software	to	control	these	high-powered	loads.	Recent	work	has	shown	the	safety	hazards	of	simple	WiFi-enabled	appliance	modules	and	light	bulbs.	Analogous	to	mandated	safety	measures	such	as	electrical	circuit	breakers,	GFCI	switches,	and	fire-rated	walls	that	protect	consumers	from	faults	in	home	infrastructure,	smart	home	technologies	need	a	similar	layer	of	protection.	Just	as	National	Electric	
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Codes	(NEC)	and	National	Electrical	Manufacturers	Association	(NEMA)	exist	to	provide	safety	guidelines,	similar	safety	enforcement	processes	need	to	evolve	for	IoT	appliances	in	the	home.	Building	codes	will	also	need	to	evolve	to	support	emerging	smart	home	technologies.	Addressing	safety	hazards	for	home	IoT	devices	will	require	a	coordinated	effort	between	the	computing	community	and	the	Department	of	Housing,	Federal	Communications	Commision	(FCC),	Underwriters	Laboratories	(UL),	and	National	Institutes	of	Standards	and	Technology	(NIST).		Smart	home	technologies,	and	the	IoT	in	general,	pose	a	new	challenge	in	abandonment	by	manufacturers,	especially	IoT	startups	that	may	introduce	a	product	in	the	market	and	quickly	go	out	of	business	or	completely	abandon	support.	These	so	called	“zombie”	devices	remain	on	a	home	network	without	future	support	for	security	and	safety	patches.	These	risks	are	problematic	for	technologies	that	are	integrated	into	the	home’s	infrastructure	or	appliances	that	may	reside	in	the	home	for	many	years,	creating	both	a	policy	and	a	technology	challenge.	There	is	a	need	for	approaches	to	effectively	detect	these	abandoned	systems	and	monitor	the	interaction	of	these	devices	with	other	platforms.	The	other	extreme	would	be	to	require	manufacturers	to	remotely	disable	legacy	devices	when	support	ceases.		
Smart	Devices	in	Hospitals	Hospitals	–	and	healthcare	in	general	–	benefit	greatly	from	computation.	Computation	can	enable	more	accurate,	more	informed	patient	care	in	the	form	of	electronic	medical	records.	Computation	enables	increased	efficiency	within	hospitals,	allowing	a	single	nursing	station	to	wirelessly	monitor	many	patients	at	once.	For	example,	a	nursing	station	could	remotely	–	and	wirelessly	–	monitor	the	drug	pumps	dispensing	drugs	to	all	the	patients	within	their	care.	Computation	even	occurs	inside	patients’	bodies	in	the	form	of	wireless	implantable	medical	devices,	like	pacemakers	and	implantable	cardiac	defibrillators.		Unfortunately,	it	has	long	been	known	that	with	the	increased	benefits	of	computation	in	hospitals	also	comes	the	potential	for	patient	harm	if	there	are	defects	in	the	systems’	software.	A	canonical	example	is	that	of	the	Therac-25,	a	radiation	therapy	device	from	the	1980s	that	was	found	to	have	a	software	defect	that	could	cause	patients	to	receive	approximately	100	times	the	radiation	therapy	that	they	were	supposed	to	receive.	This	software	defect,	human	factors,	and	project	mismanagement	resulted	in	harm	to	patients,	and	at	least	several	deaths.	These	harms	were	caused	by	accident.	In	the	cyber	security	arena,	we	must	ask:	what	might	an	intelligent,	creative	adversary	be	able	to	accomplish,	and	how	can	we	provide	resiliency	against	such	an	adversary.	That	adversary	can	clearly	cause	at	least	as	much	harm	as	might	occur	by	accident,	and	likely	more,	because	that	adversary	can	force	the	systems	into	their	worst-possible	configurations.	Moreover,	due	to	the	increased	pervasiveness	of	computation	within	the	healthcare	environment,	the	potential	attack	surface	to	cyber	adversaries	is	even	greater	today	than	it	was	the	1980s.		A	comprehensive	approach	to	cyber	security	in	hospitals	must	consider	each	of	the	computational	devices	within	the	hospitals,	as	well	as	what	those	devices	depend	on.	For	example,	cyber	attacks	against	the	hospital’s	power	infrastructure	could	significantly	impact	patient	care.	Cyber	attacks	against	the	hospital’s	water	supply	could	also	significantly	impact	patient	care.	There	have	been	cases	where	hospital	servers	have	been	shut	down	by	ransomware,	thereby	requiring	healthcare	providers	to	revert	to	paper-based	records	–	something	that	many	younger	hospital	staff	might	not	be	trained	to	work	with.	Building	on	the	ransomware	scenario,	imagine	the	impact	of	even	more	malicious	malware,	such	as	malware	that	intentionally	modifies	patient	electronic	prescriptions	or	dosages	records,	to	possibly	dangerous	drugs	or	drug	levels.	One	can	similarly	imagine	the	potential	impact	of	compromising	hospital	devices	that	directly	impact	patient	care,	ranging	from	computerized	radiation	therapy	devices	to	the	devices	that	doctors	use	to	wirelessly	change	the	
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settings	on	implantable	medical	devices,	like	pacemakers	and	implantable	drug	pumps.				We	stress	that	cyber	security	is	about	risk	management,	and	that	the	set	of	harms	that	might	be	possible	is	often	greater	than	the	set	of	harms	that	are	likely	to	occur	in	practice.	Hospitals	–	and	healthcare	in	general	–	need	to	be	vigilant	in	assessing	the	spectrum	of	potential	harms	so	that	they	are	not	surprised	by	unexpected	impacts,	and	then	realistic	about	assessing	the	actual	risk	of	these	harms.	Security	best	practices	should	be	used	whenever	possible.	For	example,	devices	should	not	use	default	passwords.	And,	when	possible,	if	a	device	is	known	to	have	a	cyber	vulnerability,	then	that	device	should	receive	a	software	update.	
Smart	Health	in	the	Home	The	previous	two	scenarios	combine	in	interesting	ways	when	one	considers	the	increasing	use	of	healthcare	technologies	in	the	home.	Whether	motivated	by	sustaining	older	adults	wishing	to	“age	in	place,”	the	increasing	use	of	wearable	sensors	(now	often	worn	before	and	after	surgical	treatment),	or	the	increasing	interest	in	accountable	care	and	the	need	to	monitor	patients	“in	the	wild”	to	help	ensure	treatment	success,	digital	technologies	are	seeping	out	of	traditional	healthcare	environments	and	finding	their	way	to	typical	homes.	In	this	perfect	storm,	we	now	have	the	safety	and	security	vulnerabilities	combined	as	two	systems	(home	and	healthcare)	attempt	to	reside	in	the	same	physical	setting	and	likely	on	the	same	wireless	network.	The	home	becomes	a	backdoor	vulnerability	to	the	hospital	and	visa	versa.			What	is	at	stake,	beyond	security,	is	the	desired	reliance	on	data	generated	in	the	home	to	inform	healthcare	decision	making.	This	data	could	be	paramount	in	helping	older	adults	avoid	the	costs	of	institutional	care,	in	helping	patients	undergoing	treatment	to	stay	out	of	emergency	rooms	when	not	needed,	and	getting	to	them	when	critical,	and	helping	patients	whose	illness	includes	environmental	triggers	(e.g.	asthma)	manage	their	treatment	and	behavior	on	a	day	to	day	basis.	
Implications	of	the	Scenarios	Security	and	Physical	Safety	The	most	important	requirement	for	collections	of	devices	is	that	they	guarantee	physical	safety	and	personal	security.	While	there	has	been	a	great	deal	of	research	and	commercial	investment	in	preventing	cyberattacks,	protecting	collections	of	devices	presents	new	challenges	that	have	not	been	addressed.	In	particular,	the	ability	of	smart	devices	to	control	physical	aspects	of	the	environment	(such	as	the	house	temperature	or	whether	a	door	is	locked)	creates	potential	attacks	on	an	individual’s	physical	safety	that	requires	even	higher	levels	of	assurance	than	existing	cyberattack	countermeasures.	The	distributed	and	interconnected	nature	of	multiple	systems	present	in	device	collections	also	requires	rethinking	of	the	basic	concept	of	security	and	system	management.	Without	taking	a	multi-system	view,	security	techniques	will	be	unable	to	anticipate	and	counter	vulnerabilities	that	arise	from	incorrect	configurations	or	attacks	that	exploit	vulnerabilities	in	the	way	that	devices	interact	with	each	other	and	with	computing	in	the	cloud.		Because	interacting	devices	have	been	present	in	hospitals	for	some	time,	and	because	hospitals	are	subject	to	regulatory	frameworks	that	require	higher	levels	of	compliance,	the	hospital	scenario	for	managing	collections	of	smart	devices	is	better	understood.	Insights	based	on	this	experience	include:	(a)	the	life-cycle	of	the	device,	including	how	software	is	upgraded,	must	be	taken	into	consideration,	(b)	physical	accessibility	of	devices,	including	the	ability	for	an	intruder	to	access	interfaces	such	as	USB	ports	or	Wifi	networks,	must	be	carefully	controlled,	and	(c)	the	regulatory	
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framework	around	privacy	makes	reasoning	about	where	data	is	collected,	how	it	is	shared,	and	where	it	is	stored	very	challenging.		Contrasting	the	two	scenarios	of	devices	in	the	home	versus	devices	in	a	hospital,	we	draw	several	conclusions.	First,	different	degrees	of	security	vetting	and	analysis	are	required	for	each	scenario.	There	are	already	regulatory	constraints	on	medical	devices	but	the	exploding	complexity	and	increasing	potential	vulnerabilities	require	thoughtful	revisiting	of	what	level	of	certification	is	required	to	provide	appropriate	levels	of	security	and	safety	assurance	for	such	applications.	The	recent	news	of	security	vulnerabilities	in	St.	Jude	pacemaker	devices	highlights	the	challenges	in	determining	the	right	level	of	cybersecurity	assurance	needed	for	individual	devices	and	also	the	overall	collection	of	devices.	Likewise,	hospitals	would	be	more	attractive	targets	for	coordinated	attacks	akin	to	current	“ransomware”	attacks	currently	being	conducted	on	hospital	electronic	health	record	(EHR)	systems.	Second,	while	hospitals	employ	IT	professionals	to	manage	their	collections	of	devices,	consumers	have	no	such	support	but	are	subjected	to	similar	challenging	system	complexity.	The	recent	report	from	the	Commission	on	Enhancing	National	Cybersecurity	highlights	similar	risks	to	small	businesses	that	cannot	afford	an	IT	staff.	Any	improvements	in	allowing	individuals	to	understand	and	manage	such	a	collection	of	devices	will	benefit	both	scenarios	but	the	consumer	scenario	requires	rethinking	how	such	systems	can	be	explained	in	terms	accessible	to	everyday	users.	Privacy	Privacy	is	challenging	to	understand	and	guarantee	in	a	world	where	more	and	more	smart	devices	collect	data,	share	it,	and	monetize	it.	The	model	that	software	is	monetized	by	advertising	is	being	applied	at	the	device	level.	Many	free	smartphone	apps	already	collect	data	at	the	user’s	expense	and	sell	it	in	ways	that	are	not	obvious	or	explicit	to	the	consumer.	Algorithmic	techniques	such	as	differential	privacy	provide	theoretical	assurances	to	limiting	the	potential	impact	of	data	sharing,	but	such	techniques	are	rarely	used	in	practice	and	as	a	result	the	privacy	implications	of	increasingly	intrusive	smart	devices	and	sensors	are	unknown.	The	complexity	of	understanding	the	privacy	policy	of	a	single	application,	like	Facebook,	can	overwhelm	individual	users	and	the	burden	of	understanding	such	policies	for	every	device	and	application	being	used	requires	attention	and	complexity	beyond	most	people.				Consider,	then,	the	challenge	of	understanding	not	just	one	device	but	many	that	interact	in	complex	ways.	Without	new	mechanisms	for	explaining	what	information	is	being	collected	and	shared,	not	by	each	individual	device,	but	in	aggregate,	users	will	be	unable	to	understand	what	the	privacy	implications	of	their	choices	are.	Consider,	for	example,	buying	a	smart	fork	(a	real	device).	How	does	a	consumer	know	what	information	the	fork	is	collecting	(beyond	counting	the	individual	fork	lifts,	for	example)?	What	if	the	consumer	then	buys	a	smart	plate?	Can	the	fork	and	plate	exchange	information?	And	if	so,	what	can	be	inferred	from	the	combination	of	the	information	that	can’t	be	determined	from	either	data	source?	Consider	for	example	an	Internet	TV	service	and	a	smart	thermostat.	The	use	of	smartphones	to	control	these	devices	creates	data	to	identify	individuals	in	the	home.	The	thermostat	can	then	pinpoint	who	is	where	in	the	home	and	when.	A	few	IoT	devices	in	the	home	can	lay	out	a	pretty	detailed	map	and	timeline	of	home	activities.		In	the	hospital	setting	regulatory	compliance	with	HIPPA	and	other	regulations	determines	what	is	legal	regarding	data	collection	and	sharing.	The	complexities	of	understanding	whether	a	particular	device	configuration	is	compliant	relies	on	the	wisdom	and	understanding	of	IT	professionals.	As	the	complexity	of	data	being	collected	increases	and	the	ways	it	is	used	become	more	diverse,	really	
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understanding	the	privacy	implications	of	a	particular	configuration	is	likely	to	challenge	even	the	best-informed	IT	professionals.				Beyond	understanding	privacy	implications	of	connected	devices	acting	as	they	are	intended,	the	implications	of	data	breaches	on	privacy	due	to	security	vulnerabilities	increases	the	complexity	and	risk	in	providing	adequate	privacy	guarantees.	Fortunately,	advances	in	storing	and	operating	on	encrypted	data	will	likely	provide	technical	solutions	to	some	of	the	challenges	of	preventing	data	breaches.	Nevertheless,	the	presence	of	malicious	state-sponsored	actors	attacking	the	privacy	of	high-profile	individuals	greatly	increases	the	level	of	protection	needed	to	provide	overall	confidence	in	such	systems.	Ultimately,	social	engineering	attacks	and	attacks	based	on	inadequate	human	understanding	of	these	systems	remains	perhaps	the	greatest	challenge	to	overcome.	Usability	and	the	User	Experience	We	have	already	made	the	case	that	the	ability	for	professionals	or	consumers	to	understand	and	manage	complex	systems	creates	significant	vulnerabilities	to	security,	safety,	and	privacy.	To	attack	this	problem	there	are	two	approaches:	either	simplify	the	systems	sufficiently	that	they	can	then	be	understood,	or	build	better	conceptual	models	for	users	and	tools	to	reduce	the	burden.	Due	to	the	widespread	use	of	open-source	software	including	Linux	in	creating	many	smart	devices,	the	configuration	of	many	smart	devices	is	arcane	and	assumes	significant	expertise	to	understand	and	manage.	Simplifications	can	be	made	by	reducing	the	number	of	choices	and	exposing	the	configuration	as	a	“wizard”	but	there	are	limits	to	what	can	be	eliminated.	Another	simplification	is	to	explicitly	disallow	devices	from	interacting	with	each	other.	While	this	scheme	reduces	the	management	burden	of	the	user,	it	also	significantly	reduces	the	potential	value	of	the	system.	For	example,	a	device	that	determines	that	there	is	no	one	present	in	a	house	might	want	to	communicate	with	the	device	controlling	a	garage	door	to	close	it,	but	their	interaction	would	be	prevented.		As	an	alternative,	new	approaches	to	helping	individuals	see	the	bigger	picture	of	their	entire	device	collection	is	possible.	In	particular,	a	“device	dashboard”	might	present	a	view	of	all	the	devices,	how	each	is	configured,	and	how	they	relate.	Such	a	view	can	extend	familiar	concepts	that	users	have	in	managing	individual	computers,	such	as	security	and	privacy	settings,	to	understanding	their	entire	network.	With	such	an	aggregate	view,	tools	that	help	users	track	the	configuration,	such	as	individual	software	updates,	and	guarantee	the	current	configuration	is	secure	can	be	developed	and	marketed.		Understanding	how	people	think	about	technology,	their	willingness	to	adopt	it,	and	their	challenges	in	maintaining	it	needs	to	be	a	critical	part	of	smart	device	research	and	policy	going	forward.	No	level	of	software	security	is	sufficient	if	the	person	configuring	the	system	fails	to	provide	adequate	passwords	or	understand	that	the	system	is	misconfigured.	Historically	the	human	dimension	of	design	could	be	offloaded	to	expert	IT	professionals	but	increasingly	these	hard	usability	problems	need	to	be	handled	directly	by	consumers.		
Recommendations	Based	on	this	discussion,	we	recommend	the	following	approach	to	expanding	the	research	agenda	and	policy	agenda	based	on	advances	in	the	Internet	of	Things	and	adhoc	collections	of	smart	devices.		
Broad	conclusions	
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• Problems	of	security,	privacy	and	usability	cannot	be	considered	separately	-	they	need	to	be	considered	together	and	federal	investments	should	prioritize	solutions	that	focus	on	augmenting	a	person’s	ability	to	understand	and	manage	complex	systems.	
• The	potential	for	risks	to	physical	safety	requires	that	minimum	levels	of	cybersecurity	assurance	be	defined	and	required	for	widespread	device	deployment.	
• Milestones	must	be	established	for	determining	the	level	of	analysis	and	testing	required	for	smart	device	products	(akin	to	targeted	EPA	emission	requirements).	Specifically	improve:	
• The	transparency	of	the	software	the	devices	are	running	for	inspection	and	analysis	
• The	level	of	testing	and	analysis	required	for	certification	
• The	level	of	hardening	of	the	critical	components	(crypto,	secure	communication,	secure	update	channels)		
Secure	and	manage	individual	devices	Existing	efforts	such	as	the	Cybersecurity	Assurance	Program	and	the	Report	of	the	Commission	on	Enhancing	National	Cybersecurity	provide	guidelines	and	requirements	to	help	ensure	that	individual	devices	are	sufficiently	secured.		Beyond	the	current	investments	we	recommend:	
• Revising	safety	requirements	for	internet-connected	electrical	devices	with	an	emphasis	on	adversarial	thinking,	in	order	to	limit	the	damage	that	a	remote	attacker	with	harmful	intent	is	able	to	do.	
• Increasing	the	emphasis	on	building	software	and	hardware	based	on	verified	components.		Program	verification	technology	is	advancing	rapidly	and	increasingly	complex	subsystems,	such	as	cryptographic	implementations	should	be	developed	using	state	of	the	art	verification	tools.	
• Increasing	requirements	for	program	analysis	and	testing	tools	to	certify	software	deployments	in	smart	devices,	with	different	levels	of	analysis	required	depending	on	the	degree	to	which	physical	safety	might	be	threatened	by	the	device.	
• Improving	software	update	requirements	for	devices	that	are	deployed	to	allow	software	to	be	patched	as	new	vulnerabilities	are	discovered.	
• Updating	mechanisms	that	are	resistant	to	exploitation	using	state-of-the-art	encryption.	
• Creating	cradle-to-grave	requirements	that	specify	what	happens	when	devices	are	no	longer	being	updated,	for	example,	because	to	the	company	producing	them	went	out	of	business.	
• Supporting	research	to	help	users	correctly	maintain	their	devices	and	software.		
Managing	collections	of	devices	Very	little	has	been	specified	regarding	managing	collections	of	devices	despite	the	fact	that	they	are	increasingly	present.		As	a	starting	point,	we	recommend	the	creation	of:	
• Explicit	software	that	considers	all	the	devices	in	a	collection	and	presents	an	overview	of	them	to	a	user	(device	dashboard).	
• Management	tools	that	allow	the	user	to	understand	and	change	the	configuration	so	that	it	remains	secure	over	time.	
• Simplifications	in	the	complexity	of	configuration	management	that	prevent	users	from	common	errors	that	create	security	or	privacy	errors.	
• A	user	experience	that	leverages	concepts	that	users	are	already	familiar	with	in	managing	individual	devices.		
Summary	
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Technology	is	rapidly	evolving	and	having	a	greater	impact	on	society	than	it	has	ever	had	with	sensing	and	intelligence	starting	to	be	embedded	in	every	device.	The	advances	bring	significant	benefits	to	people,	companies,	and	organizations,	but	until	the	technology	is	better	understood,	there	are	also	associated	risks.	We	have	outlined	some	of	the	implications	of	these	changes	through	a	discussion	of	use-case	scenarios	and	the	dimensions	of	safety,	security,	and	privacy.	We	believe	that	changes	are	happening	with	such	speed	and	the	level	of	risk	and	uncertainty	is	sufficiently	high	that	investment	in	research	that	helps	mitigate	potential	problems	should	be	prioritized.	The	potential	benefit	to	human	lives,	our	national	interests,	and	the	economy	is	sufficient	to	warrant	substantial	research	investments	in	making	the	technology	as	beneficial	as	possible.																		For	citation	use:	Fu	K.,	Kohno	T.,	Lopresti	D.,	Mynatt	E.,	Nahrstedt	K.,	Patel	S.,	Richardson	D.,	&	Zorn	B.,	(2017).	Safety,	Security,	and	Privacy	Threats	Posed	by	Accelerating	Trends	in	the	Internet	of	Things.	http://cra.org/ccc/resources/ccc-led-whitepapers/		
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